We provide a generic transformation from any affine message authentication code (MAC) to an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme over pairing groups of prime order. If the MAC satisfies a security notion related to unforgeability against chosen-message attacks and, for example, the k-Linear assumption holds, then the resulting IBE scheme is adaptively secure. Our security reduction is tightness preserving, i.e., if the MAC has a tight security reduction so has the IBE scheme. Furthermore, the transformation also extends to hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE). We also show how to construct affine MACs with a tight security reduction to standard assumptions. This, among other things, provides the first tightly secure HIBE in the standard model.
Introduction
Identity-based encryption (IBE) [26] enables a user to encrypt to a recipient's identity id (e.g., an email or phone number), and decryption can be done using a user secret key for id, obtained by a trusted authority. The first instantiations of an IBE scheme were given in 2001 [8, 5, 25] . Whereas earlier constructions relied on the random oracle model, the first adaptively secure construction in the standard model was proposed in [28] . Here adaptive security means that an adversary may select the challenge identity id * after seeing the public key and arbitrarily many user secret keys for identities of his choice. The concept of IBE generalizes naturally to hierarchical IBE (HIBE). In an L-level HIBE, hierarchical identities are vectors of identities of maximal length L and user secret keys for a hierarchical identity can be delegated. An IBE is simply a L-level HIBE with L = 1.
In this work we focus on adaptively secure (H)IBE schemes in the standard model. The construction from [28] has the disadvantage of a non-tight security reduction, i.e., the security reduction reducing security of the L-level HIBE to the hardness of the underlying assumption loses at least a factor of Q L , where Q is the maximal number of user secret key queries. Modern HIBE schemes [27, 7] only lose a factor Q, independent of L. The first tightly secure IBE was recently proposed by Chen and Wee [7] but designing a L-level HIBE for L > 1 and a tight (i.e., independent of Q) security reduction to a standard assumption remains an open problem.
Until now, all known constructions of (H)IBE schemes are specific, i.e., they are custom-made to a specific hardness assumption. This is in contrast to other basic cryptographic primitives such as signatures and public-key encryption, for which efficient generic transformations have been known for a long time. We would like to highlight the concept of smooth projective hash proof systems for chosenciphertext secure encryption [10] and an old construction by Bellare and Goldwasser [2] that transforms any pseudorandom function (PRF) plus a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof into a signature scheme. Until today no generic construction of a (H)IBE from any "simple" low-level cryptographic primitive is known. However, the recent IBE scheme by Chen and Wee [7] uses a specific randomized PRF at the core of their construction, but its usage is non-modular.
This work
Affine MACs. In this work we put forward the notion of affine message authentication codes (affine MACs). An affine MAC over Z n q is a randomized MAC with a special algebraic structure over some group G = g of prime-order q. For a vector a ∈ Z n q , define [a] := g a = (g a1 , . . . , g an ) ∈ G n as the implicit representation of a over G. Roughly speaking, the MAC tag τ m = ([t], [u] ) of an affine MAC over Z n q on message m ∈ M is split into a random message-independent part [t] ∈ G n plus a message-depending affine part [u] ∈ G satisfying
where f i , f i : M → Z q are public functions and x i ∈ Z n q , x i ∈ Z q are from the secret key sk MAC . Almost all group-based MACs recently considered in [11] , as well as the MAC derived from the randomized Naor-Reingold PRF [23] implicitly given in [7] are affine.
From Affine MACs to IBE. Let us fix (possibly symmetric) pairing groups G 1 , G 2 , G T equipped with a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T . Let D k -MDDH be any Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption [12] * that holds in G 1 , e.g., k-Linear or DDH.
Our main result is a generic transformation IBE[MAC n , D k ] from any affine message authentication code MAC n over Z n q into an IBE scheme. If MAC n (defined over G 2 ) is PR-CMA-secure (pseudorandom against chosen message attacks, a decisional variant of the standard UF-CMA security for MACs) and the D k -MDDH assumption holds in G 1 , then IBE[MAC n , D k ] is an adaptively secure (and anonymous) IBE scheme. Furthermore, the security reduction of IBE[MAC n , D k ] is as tight as the one of MAC n . The size of the public IBE parameters depends on the size of the MAC secret key sk MAC , whereas the IBE ciphertexts and user secret keys always contain n + k + 1 group elements. We stress that our transformation works with any k ≥ 1 and any D k -MDDH Assumption, hence D k can be chosen to match the security assumption of MAC n .
We also extend our generic transformation to HIBE schemes. In particular, we have two generic HIBE constructions depending on different properties of the underlying affine MACs. If the affine MAC is delegatable (to be defined in Section 5.1), we obtain an adaptively secure L-level HIBE HIBE[MAC n , D k ]. Furthermore, if the affine MAC is delegatable and anonymity-preserving (to be defined in Section 5.5), we obtain an anonymous and adaptively secure L-level HIBE AHIBE[MAC n , D k ]. Both of the constructions have the same tightness properties as the MAC, and their ciphertexts sizes are the same as in the IBE case. Due to different delegation methods, AHIBE[MAC n , D k ] has slightly shorter public parameters, but larger user secret keys than HIBE[MAC n , D k ].
Let us highlight again the fact that the underlying object is a symmetric primitive (a MAC) that we transform to an asymmetric primitive (an IBE scheme). Furthermore, as a MAC is a very simple and well-understood object, we hope that our transformation can contribute to understanding the more complex object of an IBE scheme.
Two Delegatable Affine MACs. To instantiate our transformations, we consider two specific delegatable affine MACs. Our first construction, MAC NR [D k ], is a generalization of the MAC derived from the randomized Naor-Reingold PRF [7] to any D k -MDDH Assumption. (Unfortunately, the MAC based on the original deterministic Naor-Reingold PRF is not affine. ) We show that it is affine over Z n q with n = k and delegatable. We prove PR-CMA-security with an (almost) tight security reduction to D k -MDDH. (Almost tight, as the security reduction loses a factor O(m), where m is the length of the message space.) This leads to the first HIBE with a tight security reduction to a standard assumption. Ciphertexts and user secret keys of HIBE[MAC NR [D k ], D k ] only contain 2k + 1 group elements which is 3 in case we use * The D k -MDDH assumption over G 1 captures naturally all subspace decisional assumptions over prime order groups.
Concretely, it states that given [A] 1 ∈ G (k+1)×k , the value [A · w] 1 ∈ G k+1 1 is pseudorandom, where A ∈ Z (k+1)×k q gets chosen according to distribution D k and w ∈ Z k q . Examples include k-Linear and DDH (k = 1).
Scheme |pk| |usk| |C| Anon. Loss Assumption Wat05 [28] (4 + λ)|G1| 2|G2| 2|G1| -O(λQ) DBDH Wat09 [27] 12|G1| + |GT | 8|G2| + |Zq| 9|G1| + |Zq| -O(Q) 2-LIN Lew12 [19] 24|G1| + |GT | 6|G2| 6|G1| √ O(Q) 2-LIN CLL + 12 [6] 8|G1| + |GT | 4|G2| 4|G1| -O(Q) SXDH JR13 [16] 6|G1| , is based on a hash proof system given in [12] for any D k -MDDH problem. A hash proof system is known to imply a UF-CMA-secure MAC [11] . We extend this result to PR-CMA-security, where the reduction loses a factor of Q, the number of MAC queries. Furthermore, MAC HPS [D k ] is affine over Z k+1 q (i.e., n = k + 1) and delegatable. Whereas public parameters of the L-level HIBE HIBE[MAC HPS [D k ], D k ] only depend on L, ciphertexts and user secret keys contain 2k + 2 group elements which is 4 in case of the SXDH assumption (k = 1). We remark that the efficiency of HIBE[MAC HPS [D k ], D k ] is roughly the same as a HIBE proposed in [7] . Additionally, we show MAC HPS [D k ] is also anonymity-preserving, which implies an anonymous (but non-tight) HIBE,
] is unlikely to be anonymity-preserving. Table 1 summarizes all known (H)IBE scheme and their parameters.
Extensions. In fact, our generic transformation even gives (hierarchical) ID-based hash proof system from any (delegatable) affine MAC and the D k -MDDH assumption. From an (H)ID-based hash proof system one readily obtains an IND-ID-CCA-secure (H)IBE [18] . Furthermore, any (H)IBE directly implies a (Hierarchical ID-based) signature scheme [13, 17] . The signature obtained from
has a tight security reduction. Even though it is not entirely structure preserving, it can still be used to obtain a constant-size IND-CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme with a tight security reduction in the multi-user and multi-challenge setting [15, 4] .
Technical details
Our Transformation. The high level idea behind our generic transformation IBE[MAC, D k ] from any affine MAC over Z n q to an IBE scheme is the transformation from Bellare and Goldwasser [2] from a MAC (originally, a PRF) and a NIZK to a signature scheme. We use the same approach but define the user secret keys to be Bellare-Goldwasser signatures. The (H)IBE encryption functionality makes use of the special properties of the algebraic MAC and (tuned) Groth-Sahai proofs.
Concretely, the public key pk of the IBE scheme contains special perfectly hiding commitments [Z] 1 to the MAC secret keys sk MAC , which also depend on the D k -MDDH assumption. The user secret key
on id, plus a tuned Groth-Sahai [14] non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof π that τ id was computed correctly with respect to the commitments [Z] 1 containing sk MAC . Since the MAC is affine, the NIZK proof π ∈ G k is very compact. The next observation is that the NIZK verification equation for π is a linear equation in the (committed) MAC secret keys and hence a randomized version of it gives rise to the IBE ciphertext and a decryption algorithm.
Security Proof. The security proof can also be sketched easily at a high level. We first apply a Cramer-Shoup argument [9] , where we decrypt the IBE challenge ciphertext using the MAC secret key sk MAC . Next, we make the challenge ciphertext inconsistent which involves one application of the D k -MDDH assumption. Now we can use the NIZK simulation routine to simulate the NIZK proof π from the user secret key usk[id] = (τ id , π). At this point, as the commitments perfectly hide the MAC secret keys sk MAC , the only part of the security experiment still depending on sk MAC is τ id from usk[id] plus the computation of the challenge ciphertext. Now we are in the position to make the reduction to the symmetric primitive. We can use the PR-CMA symmetric security of MAC to argue directly about the pseudorandomness of the IBE challenge ciphertext. An IBE with pseudorandom ciphertexts is both IND-CPA secure and anonymous.
Other related work
Recently, Wee [29] proposed an information-theoretic primitive called predicate encodings that characterize the underlying algebraic structure of a number of predicate encoding schemes, including known IBE [21] and attribute-based encryption (ABE) [20] schemes. The main conceptual difference to affine MACs is that predicate encodings is a purely information-theoretic object. Furthermore, the framework by Wee is inherently limited to composite order groups.
Waters introduced the dual system framework [27] in order to facility tighter proofs for (H)IBE systems and beyond. The basic idea is that there exists functional and semi-functional ciphertexts and user secret keys, that are computationally indistinguishable. Decrypting a ciphertext with a user secret key is successful unless both are semi-functional. The D k -MDDH assumptions are specifically tailored to the dual system framework as they provide natural subspace assumptions over G k+1 . Previous dual system constructions [27, 21, 7] usually first construct a scheme over composite-order groups and then transform it into prime-order groups. As the transformation uses a subspace assumption over G k+1 for each component of the composite-order group, ciphertexts and user secret keys contain at least 2(k + 1) group elements. An exception is a recent direct construction in prime-order groups by Jutla and Roy [16] . Their scheme is based on the SXDH assumption (i.e., k = 1) and achieves slightly better ciphertext size of 3 group elements plus one element from Z q . Even though our construction and proof strategy is inspired by the Bellare-Goldwasser NIZK approach and Cramer-Shoup's hash proof systems, we still roughly follow the dual system framework. However, as we give a direct construction in prime-order groups, our IBE scheme IBE[MAC NR [D k ], D k ] has ciphertexts and user secret keys of size 2k + 1, breaking the "2(k + 1) barrier". Lewko and Waters [22] consider the difficulty of a security proof for L-level HIBEs that does not proving exponentially in L. Essentially, they prove that any scheme with rerandomizable user secret keys (over the space of all "functional" user secret keys) will suffer an exponential degradation in security. While some of our tightly-secure HIBEs are rerandomizable, they are only rerandomizable over the space of all user secret keys generated by the user secret key generation algorithm. Hence, our tightly-secure HIBE does not contradict the negative results of [22].
Open problems
We leave finding a PR-CMA-secure algebraic MAC with a tight security reduction and constant-size secret keys as an open problem. Given our main result this would directly imply a tightly-secure (H)IBE with constant-size public parameters. Furthermore, we leave finding a tightly-secure and anonymity-preserving delegatable affine MAC as an open problem, which would imply a tightly-secure anonymous HIBE.
Finally, we think that the concept of algebraic MACs can be extended such that our transformation also covers more general predicate encoding schemes, including attribute-based encryption.
Definitions

Notation
If x ∈ B n , then |x| denotes the length n of the vector. Further, x ← $ B denotes the process of sampling an element x from set B uniformly at random. If A ∈ Z (k+1)×n q is a matrix, then A ∈ Z k×n q denotes the upper matrix of A and then A ∈ Z 1×k q denotes the last row of A.
Games. We use games for our security reductions. A game G is defined by procedures Initialize and Finalize, plus some optional procedures P 1 , . . . , P n . All procedures are given using pseudo-code, where initially all variables are undefined. An adversary A is executed in game G if it first calls Initialize, obtaining its output. Next, it may make arbitrary queries to P i (according to their specification), again obtaining their output. Finally, it makes one single call to Finalize(·) and stops. We define G A as the output of A's call to Finalize.
Pairing groups and Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let GGen be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm that on input 1 λ returns a description G = (G 1 , G 2 , G T , q, g 1 , g 2 , e) of asymmetric pairing groups where G 1 , G 2 , G T are cyclic groups of order q for a λ-bit prime q, g 1 and g 2 are generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively, and e : G 1 × G 2 is an efficiently computable (non-degenerated) bilinear map. Define g T := e(g 1 , g 2 ), which is a generator in G T .
We use implicit representation of group elements as introduced in [12] . For s ∈ {1, 2, T } and a ∈ Z q define [a] s = g a s ∈ G s as the implicit representation of a in G s . More generally, for a matrix A = (a ij ) ∈ Z n×m q we define [A] s as the implicit representation of A in G s :
We will always use this implicit notation of elements in G s , i.e., we let [a] s ∈ G s be an element in G s . Note that from [a] s ∈ G s it is generally hard to compute the value a (discrete logarithm problem in 
We recall the definition of the matrix Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumption [12] . 
where the probability is taken over
For each k ≥ 1, [12] specifies distributions L k , C k , SC k , IL k such that the corresponding D k -MDDH assumption is the k-Linear assumption, the k-Cascade, the k-Symmetric Cascade, and the Incremental k-Linear Assumption, respectively. All assumptions are generically secure in bilinear groups and form a hierarchy of increasingly weaker assumptions. The distributions are exemplified for k = 2, where a 1 , . . . , a 6 ← $ Z q .
It was also shown in [12] that U k -MDDH is implied by all other D k -MDDH assumptions. If A is chosen from SC k , then [A] s can be represented with 1 group element; if A is chosen from L k or C k , then [A] s can be represented with k group elements; If A is chosen from U k , then [A] s can be represented with (k + 1)k group elements. Hence, SC k -MDDH offers the same security guarantees as k-Linear, while having the advantage of a more compact representation.
Let
That is, the m-fold D k -MDDH problem contains m independent instances of the D k -MDDH problem (with the same A but different w i ). By a hybrid argument one can show that the two problems are equivalent, where the reduction loses a factor m. The following lemma gives a tight reduction. [12] ) For any matrix distribution D k , D k -MDDH is random self-reducible. In particular, for any m ≥ 1,
Lemma 2.3 (Random self reducibility
Adv D k ,GGen (D) + 1 q − 1 ≥ Adv m D k ,GGen (D ) := Pr[D (G, [A], [AW]) ⇒ 1] − Pr[D (G, [A], [U]) ⇒ 1], with G ← GGen(1 λ ), A ← $ D k , W ← $ Z k×m q , U ← $ Z (k+1)×m q .
Message Authentication Codes
We use the standard definition of a (randomized) message authentication code MAC = (Gen MAC , Tag, Ver), where sk MAC ← $ Gen MAC (par) returns a secret key, τ ← $ Tag(sk MAC , m) returns a tag τ on message m from some message space M, and Ver(sk MAC , m, τ ) ∈ {0, 1} returns a verification bit.
Affine MACs
Affine MACs over Z n q are group-based MACs with a specific algebraic structure.
Definition 3.1 Let par be system parameters containing a group G = (G 2 , q, g 2 ) of prime-order q and let n ∈ N. We say that MAC = (Gen MAC , Tag, Ver) is affine over Z n q if the following conditions hold: 1. Gen MAC (par) returns sk MAC containing (B, x 0 , . . . , x , x 0 , . . . , x ), where B ∈ Z n×n q , x i ∈ Z n q , x j ∈ Z q , for some n , , ∈ N. We assume B has rank at least one.
for some public defining functions f i : M → Z q and f i : M → Z q . Vector t is the randomness and u is the (deterministic) message-depending part.
The standard security notion for probabilistic MACs is unforgeability against chosen-message attacks UF-CMA [11] . In this work we require pseudorandom against chosen-message attacks (PR-CMA), which is slightly stronger than UF-CMA. Essentially, we require that the values used for one single verification equation (3) on message m * are pseudorandom over G 1 and G T . Let G = (G 1 , G 2 , G T , q, g 1 , g 2 , e) be an asymmetric pairing group such that (G 2 , g 2 , q) is contained in par. We define the PR-CMA security via games PR-CMA real and PR-CMA rand from Figure 1 . Note that the output
of Chal(m * ) in game PR-CMA real can be viewed as a "token" for message m * to check verification equation (3) for arbitrary tags
Intuitively, the pseudorandomness of [h 1 ] T is responsible for indistinguishabilty and of [h 0 ] 1 to prove anonymity of the IBE scheme.
where the experiments are defined in Figure 1 .
An Affine MAC from the Naor-Reingold PRF
Unfortunately, the (deterministic) Naor-Reingold pseudorandom function is not affine. We use the following randomized version MAC NR [D k ] = (Gen MAC , Tag, Ver) of it based on any matrix assumption D k . For the special case D k = L k , it was implicitly given in [7] . Recall that, for any matrix A ∈ Z Gen MAC (par):
Ver(sk MAC , τ, m):
we have n = n = k, = 0, = 2m + 1 and functions f 0 (m) = f 1 (m) = 0, f 0 (m) = 1, and f 2i+b (m) = (m i = b) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. (To perfectly fit our definition, x i,b should be renamed to x 2i+b , but we conserve the other notations for better readability.)
Note that the security bound is (almost) tight, as m is the bit-length of message space M. The proof follows the ideas from [7, 24] . We use m hybrids, where in hybrid i all the (maximal Q) values x i,1−m * i · t in the response to an Eval query are replaced by uniform randomness. Here m * is the message from the challenge query. We use the Q-fold D k -MDDH assumption to interpolate between the hybrids, where the reductions guesses m * i correctly with probability 1/2. As the Q-fold D k -MDDH assumption is tightly implied by the standard D k -MDDH assumption (Lemma 2.3), the proof follows.
We remark, that one can define an alternative version of MAC NR [D k ] by setting
This MAC has a shorter secret key and can also be shown to be PR-CMA. (However, it does not satisfy the stronger security notion of HPR-CMA needed in Section 5.) Initialize: Game G 0 is the real attack game and in G 1,0 , we syntactically replace x 0 by RF 0 ( ) which is a fixed random element.
Proof: Let Q be the maximal number of Eval queries made by A. We first build an adversary B against the Q-fold D k -MDDH Assumption such that
This implies the lemma using the random self reducibility of the MDDH assumption (Lemma 2.3).
, B first picks a random bit b which is a guess for m * i . Let RF i−1 and RF i−1 be two independent random functions (defined on the fly) which we use to define
The construction of B is described in Figure 3 . Note that if RF i−1 and RF i−1 are random functions, then RF i is a random function.
Assume B correctly guesses b = m * i (which happens with probability 1/2). By the definition of RF i and by m *
We now analyze the output distribution of the Eval queries. First note that t is uniformly random over Z k q in both games G 1,i and G 1,i−1 . As for the distribution of u, we only need to consider the case
For j = 1, . . . , m and j = 0, 1 : 
If R c = 0, then u is distributed as in game G 1,i−1 . If R c is uniform, then define RF (m |i−1 ) := r R c and u is distributed as in G 1,i .
Proof: In G 1,m , the values u computed in Eval(m) are masked by RF m (m) and are hence uniformly random.
Finally, we do all the previous steps in reverse order, as shown in Figure 4 . Clearly, H 2 = G 2 and H 0 = PR-CMA rand . Following the arguments of Lemmas 3.4 to 3.6 in reverse order, one obtains the following lemma.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
An Affine MAC from Hash Proof System
Let D k be a matrix distribution. We now combine the hash proof system for the subset membership problem induced by the D k -MDDH assumption from [12] with the generic MAC construction from [11] and obtain the following MAC HPS [D k ] for M = Z q .
Initialize: Gen MAC (par):
For the moment we use = 1 which already gives a MAC with exponential message space M = Z q .
Combining [12, 11] we obtain that MAC HPS [D k ] is UF-CMA under the D k -MDDH assumption. The proof extends to show even PR-CMA security. Compared to MAC NR [D k ], we lose the tight reduction, but gain much shorter public parameters. Initialize: Proof: We prove Theorem 3.8 by defining a sequence of intermediate games as in Figure 5 . Let A be an adversary against the PR-CMA-security of MAC HPS [D k ]. Game G 0 is the real attack game. In games G 1,i , the first i − 1 queries to the Eval oracle are answered with uniform values in G k+1 2 × G 2 and the rest are answered as in the real scheme. To interpolate between G 1,i and G 1,i+1 , we also define G 1,i , which answers the i-th query to Eval by picking a random t ← $ Z k+1 q . By definition, we have G 0 = G 1,1 .
Proof: Games G 1,i and G 1,i only differ in the distribution of t returned by the Eval oracle for its ith query, namely, t ∈ span(B) or uniform. From that, we obtain a straightforward reduction to the D k -MDDH Assumption.
Proof: At a high level, these two games are only separated by the 2-universality of the underlying hash proof system. Let m be the i-th query to Eval and let ([t] 2 , [u] 2 ) be its tag. As m = m * , there exists an index i such that m i = m * i , where m i (resp. m * i ) denotes the i -th entry of m (resp. m * ). We use an information-theoretic argument to show that in G 1,i the value u − x 0 is uniformly random. For simplicity, we assume x 0 and x j (j ∈ {0, i }) are known to A. Information-theoretically, adversary A may also learn B x 0 and B x i from the c-th query with c > i. Thus, A information-theoretically obtains the following equations in the unknown variables
where I k+1 is the (k + 1) × (k + 1) identity matrix. To show that u − x 0 is linearly independent of B x 0 , B x i and h 0 , we argue that the last row of M is linearly independent of all the other rows. Since t / ∈ span(B) (except with probability 1/q), t is independent of B ; by m i = m * i , the last row of M is linearly independent of rows 2k + 1 to 3k + 1. We conclude that u is uniformly random in A's view.
Proof: Note that A can ask at most Q-many Eval queries. In both G 1,Q+1 and G 2 , all answers of Eval are uniformly at random and independent of the secret keys (x 0 , x 0 , . . . , x ). Hence, the values h 0 and h 1 from G 1,Q+1 are uniform in the view of A.
We now do all the previous steps in the reverse order as in Figure 6 . Then, by using the above arguments in a reverse order, we have the following lemma. 
Theorem 3.8 follows by combining Lemmas 3.9-3.13.
Initialize: 
Identity-based Encryption from Affine MACs
In this section, we will present our transformation IBE[MAC, D k ] from affine MACs to IBE based on the D k -MDDH assumption.
Identity-based Key Encapsulation
We now recall syntax and security of IBE in terms of an ID-based key encapsulation mechanism IBKEM. Every IBKEM can be transformed into an ID-based encryption scheme IBE using a (one-time secure) symmetric cipher. • The probabilistic key generation algorithm Gen(1 λ ) returns the (master) public/secret key (pk, sk).
We assume that pk implicitly defines a message space M, an identity space ID, a key space K, and ciphertext space C. • The probabilistic user secret key generation algorithm USKGen(sk, id) returns the user secret-key usk[id] for identity id ∈ ID. • The probabilistic encapsulation algorithm Enc(pk, id) returns the symmetric key K ∈ K together with a ciphertext C ∈ C with respect to identity id. • The deterministic decapsulation algorithm Dec(usk[id], id, C) returns the decapsulated key K ∈ K or the reject symbol ⊥. For perfect correctness we require that for all λ ∈ N, all pairs (pk, sk) generated by Gen(1 λ ), all identities id ∈ ID, all usk[id] generated by USKGen(sk, id) and all (K, C) output by Enc(pk, id):
The security requirements for an IBKEM we consider here are indistinguishability and anonymity against chosen plaintext and identity attacks (IND-ID-CPA and ANON-ID-CPA). Instead of defining both security notions separately, we define pseudorandom ciphertexts against chosen plaintext and identity attacks (PR-ID-CPA) which means that challenge key and ciphertext are both pseudorandom. Note that PR-ID-CPA trivially implies IND-ID-CPA and ANON-ID-CPA.
We define PR-ID-CPA-security of IBKEM formally via the games given in Figure 7 .
Procedure Initialize: (pk, sk) ←$ Gen(1 λ ) Return pk
Procedure USKGen(id): 
The Transformation
Let D k be a matrix distribution that outputs matrices A ∈ Z Gen(par):
USKGen(sk, id):
Enc(pk, id):
The intuition behind our construction is that the values [Z i ] 1 , [z i ] 1 from pk can be viewed as perfectly hiding commitments to the secrets keys sk MAC = (x 1 , . . . , x , x 1 , . . . , x ) of MAC. User secret key generation computes the MAC tag τ = ([t] 2 , [u] 2 ) ← $ Tag(sk MAC ) plus a "non-interactive zero-knowledge proof"
[v] 2 proving that τ was computed correctly with respect to the commitments. As the MAC is affine, the NIZK proof has a very simple structure. The encryption algorithm is derived from a randomized version of the NIZK verification equation. Here we again make use of the affine structure of MAC.
To show correctness of IBKEM[MAC, D k ], let (K, C) be the output of Enc(pk, id) and let usk[id] be the output of USKGen(sk, id). By Equation (3) in Section 3, we have
and the quotient of the two elements yields K = ( i=0 f i (id)z i ) · r. 
Enc(id * ):
Return K * and C * Figure 8 : Games G0-G4 for the proof of Theorem 4.3.
adversaries Proof: G 0 is the real attack game. In game G 1 , we change the simulation of c * 1 and K * in Enc(id * ) by substituting Z i and z i with their respective definitions:
Proof: The only difference between G 2 and G 1 is that c * 0 is chosen uniformly at random over Z k+1 q . It is easy to see that the joint distribution of (G,
More formally, we build a distinguisher B 1 . B 1 takes as input (G, [A] 1 , [b] 1 ) and it has to distinguish if b = Aw for some random vector w ∈ Z k q or b is uniformly random. B 1 simulates USKGen and Finalize the same way as in G 2 and G 1 . We only describe the simulation of Initialize and Enc in Figure 9 . Note that B 1 knows the secrets then the simulation is distributed as in G 1 . If b is uniformly random, then the simulation is distributed as in G 2 .
Following the intuition of the construction, in Game G 3 , we simulate the values v computed in the USKGen algorithm using a "perfect zero-knowledge" simulator, and Enc is simulated without using (Y i ) 0≤i≤ and (y i ) 0≤i≤ , which is ready to conclude the proof by using the PR-CMA security of MAC.
Proof: G 3 does not use (Y i ) 0≤i≤ and (y i ) 0≤i≤ any more. We now show that the changes are purely conceptual.
Note that we can compute [v] 2 in G 2 , since A, z i and Z i are known explicitly over Z q and [t] 2 and [u] 2 are known.
As for the distribution of Enc(id * ), it is easy to see that c * 0 is uniformly random, as in
and c * 1 is distributed as in G 2 . The distribution of K * can be analyzed with a similar argument. 
Proof: In G 4 , we answer the Enc(id * ) query by choosing random K * and C * . We construct an adversary B 2 in Figure 10 to show the differences between G 4 and G 3 can be bounded by the advantage of breaking PR-CMA security of MAC. Intuitively, the reduction to PR-CMA security of the symmetric primitive MAC Initialize:
Enc(id * ): can be carried out as in both G 3 and G 4 , sk MAC (i.e., x i and x i ) is perfectly hidden until B 2 's call to Enc(id * ).
If (h 0 , h 1 ) is uniform (i.e., B 2 is in Game PR-CMA rand ) then the view of A is the same as in G 4 . If (h 0 , h 1 ) is real (i.e., B 2 is in Game PR-CMA real ) then the view of A is the same as in G 3 .
The proof of Theorem 4.3 follows by Lemmas 4.4-4.7 and observing that G 4 = PR-ID-CPA rand .
Hierarchical Identity-based Encryption from Delegatable Affine MACs
In this section, we will define syntax and security requirements of delegatable affine MACs and describe our transformation HIBE[MAC, D k ] from delegatable affine MACs to HIBE based on any D k -MDDH assumption. 
Delegatable Affine MACs
Note that for a delegatable MAC, equation (3) simplifies to
Intuitively, this property will be used for HIBE user secret key delegation.
Security requirements. Let MAC be a delegatable affine MAC over Z n q with message space M = B ≤m := m i=1 B i . To build a HIBE, we require a new notion denoted as HPR 0 -CMA security. It differs from PR-CMA security in two ways. Firstly, additional values needed for HIBE delegation are provided Initialize: to the adversary through the call to Initialize and Eval. Secondly, Chal always returns a real h 0 which is the reason why our HIBE is not anonymous. (In fact, the additional values actually allow the adversary to distinguish real from random h 0 .) Let G = (G 1 , G 2 , G T , q, g 1 , g 2 , e) be an asymmetric pairing group such that (G 2 , g 2 , q) is contained in par. Consider the games from Figure 11 .
Examples of Delegatable Affine MACs
We first note that MAC NR [D k ] from Section 3 with message space M = {0, 1} ≤m is delegatable. The proof is postponed to Appendix A.2
Hierarchical Identity-Based Key Encapsulation
We recall syntax and security of a hierarchical identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (HIBKEM).
Definition 5.5 (Hierarchical Identity-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism)
A hierarchical identitybased key encapsulation mechanism (HIBE) HIBKEM consists of three PPT algorithms HIBKEM = (Gen, USKDel, , USKGen, Enc, Dec) with the following properties.
• The probabilistic key generation algorithm Gen(1 λ ) returns the (master) public/secret key and delegation key (pk, sk, dk). Note that for some of our constructions dk is empty. We assume that pk implicitly defines a message space M and hierarchical identity space ID = B ≤m , for some base identity set B.
Initialize:
(pk, sk, dk) ←$ Gen(1 λ ) Return (pk, dk) • The probabilistic user secret key generation algorithm USKGen(sk, id) returns a secret key usk[id]
and a delegation value udk[id] for hierarchical identity id ∈ ID.
• • The probabilistic encapsulation algorithm Enc(pk, id) returns a symmetric key K ∈ K together with a ciphertext C with respect to the hierarchical identity id ∈ ID.
• The deterministic decapsulation algorithm Dec(usk[id], id, C) returns a decapsulated key K ∈ K or the reject symbol ⊥.
For correctness we require that for all λ ∈ N, all pairs (pk, sk) generated by Gen(1 λ ), all id ∈ ID, all usk[id] generated by USKGen(sk, id) and all (K, c) generated by Enc(pk, id):
, id, C) = K] = 1.
Moreover, we also require the distribution of usk[id|id p+1 ] from USKDel(usk[id], udk[id], id, id p+1 ) is identical to the one from USKGen(sk, id|id p+1 ).
In our HIBKEM definition we make the delegation key dk and the user delegation key udk[id] explicit to make our constructions more readable. We define indistinguishability (IND-HID-CPA) and pseudorandom ciphertexts (PR-HID-CPA) against adaptively chosen identity and plaintext attacks for a HIBKEM via games PR-HID-CPA real , IND-HID-CPA rand and PR-HID-CPA rand from Figure 12 . Note that PR-HID-CPA trivially implies IND-HID-CPA and anonymity of HIBKEM.
The Transformation
Let D k be a matrix distribution that outputs matrices A ∈ Z Fig. 13 . Compared to the IBE construction from Sect. 4, the main difference is that Gen also returns a delegation key dk which allows re-randomization of every usk [id] . Further, USKGen also outputs user delegation keys udk[id] allowing USKDel to delegate.
Gen(par):
A ←$ D k sk MAC = (B, x0, . . . , x , x 0 ) ←$ Gen MAC (par) For i = 0, . . . , :
USKGen(sk, id ∈ ID):
If p ≥ m, then return ⊥ id := (id1, . . . , idp, idp+1) ∈ B p+1 //Delegation of u and v:
i=0 fi(id )Eis ∈ Z k q //Rerandomization of d i and ei: For i = l(id ) + 1, . . . , : To show correctness of HIBKEM[MAC, D k ], first note that (û,v) computed in USKDel is a correct user secret key for id ,û = l(id )
In the next step they get rerandmozied as u =
from USKDel has the same distribution as the one output by USKGen. By applying the similar correctness argument from HIBKEM[MAC, D k ], we can show that a correctly generated ciphertext can be correctly decapsulated by using a correct user secret key.
The next theorem shows IND-HID-CPA-security of our construction. Its proof is postponed to Appendix B.1. We remark that HIBKEM[MAC, D k ] can never be anonymous as one can always check whether c 0 · f i (id)(E i d i ) = c 1 · B using the pairing. 
Anonymity-preserving Transformation
In this section, we give an alternative (but less efficient) transformation, which is anonymity-preserving. Our transformation is based on the notion of APR-CMA-security (anonymity-preserving pseudorandomness against chosen-message attacks) for a delegatable affine MAC MAC over Z n q with message space M = B ≤m := m i=1 B i . It differs from HPR-CMA-security (Section 5.1) in the sense that Eval(m) will output the terms required for usk rerandomization, not Initialize. Let G = (G 1 , G 2 , G T , q, g 1 , g 2 , e) be Initialize:
Chal(m * ): an asymmetric pairing group such that (G 2 , g 2 , q) is contained in par. Consider the games from Figure 14 , where the (publicly known) µ is defined as the rank of matrix B output by Gen MAC (par).
Unfortunately, MAC NR [D k ] is unlikely to be APR-CMA-secure, since in the security proof the value u is not pseudorandom and, thus, we can not make h 0 random. The following theorem states that MAC HPS [D k ] from Section 3 with message space M = B ≤m = (Z * q ) ≤m is anonymous and delegatable. The proof is postponed to Section A.3.
The Anonymity-Preserving Transformation. Let D k be a matrix distribution that outputs matrices A ∈ Z (k+1)×k q . Let MAC be an delegatable affine MAC over Z n q with message space M = B ≤m . Our AHIBKEM[MAC, D k ] = (Gen, USKGen, USKDel, Enc, Dec) for key-space K = G T and hierarchical identity space ID = M = B ≤m is defined as in Fig. 15 . Compared to the HIBE construction from Section 5.4, the new construction uses a different usk rerandomization method: USKGen outputs a random basis T for vector t which allows rerandomization of t; similarly, u and V are bases for randomizing u and v. Further, Gen will never return [x i B] 2 and [Y i B] 2 , which is the key to preserve anonymity.
Correctness of AHIBKEM[MAC, D k ] follows by the same argument as HIBKEM[MAC, D k ]. The following theorem shows PR-HID-CPA security of our construction. Its proof is the same as the one of Theorem 5.7 except that we make the ciphertext to be random based on the APR-CMA security. Details are postponed to Appendix B.2. 
Gen(par):
If p ≥ m, then return ⊥ id := (id1, . . . , idp, idp+1) ∈ B p+1 //Delegation of (u, v) and (u, V):
//Rerandomization of d i and ei: For i = l(id ) + 1, . . . , : 
Initialize:
// Games G0, G1,i, G2 A ← D k ; B := A For 1 ≤ j ≤ m and j = 0, 1:
Chal(m * ):
// Games G0, G1,i , G2 , one query [20] A. B. Lewko 
Else for j = 0, 1:
For 1 ≤ j ≤ m and j = 0, 1: 
Proof: We build an adversary B against the Q-fold D k -MDDH Assumption such that
which implies the lemma by the random self reducibility of the MDDH assumption (Lemma 2.3).
For any message m ∈ M := {0, 1} ≤m , define
, B first picks a random value b ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} which is a guess for m * i and defines RF i : {0, 1} i → Z q as
The definition of B is given in Figure 17 . Note that if RF i−1 and RF i−1 are random functions, then RF i (m |i−1 ||b) and RF i (m |i−1 ||1 − b) are independent and both uniformly random.
Assume B correctly guesses b = m * i (which happens with probability 1/3). By the definition of RF i and by m * i = b we have RF i (m * |i ) = RF i−1 (m * |i−1 ), which implies Chal(m * ) is identically distributed in G 1,i and G 1,i−1 .
We now analyze the output distribution of the Eval queries. First note that t is uniformly random over Z k q in both games G 1,i and G 1,i−1 . As for the distribution of u, we only need to consider the case m i = 1 − b, since u for m i ∈ {b, ⊥} is identically distributed in games G 1,i and G 1,i−1 . Assume
x j,mj t + r R c + RF i−1 (m |i−1 ).
Proof: In G 1,m , u returned by the Eval(m) oracle is masked by RF m (m), which is uniformly random and independent of m and the secrets x j,j and x 0 . Thus, u is uniformly random in game G 1,m . Since nothing about x 0 is leaked from Eval and x 0 = RF m (m * ), h 1 is distributed uniformly at random over Z q .
In contrast to Lemma 3.6 , h 0 is not pseudorandom here, since A learns ([x j,j B] 2 ) 1≤j≤m,j =0,1 from its call to Initialize. By checking the pairing equation
Finally, we do all the previous steps in reverse order similar to Lemma 3.7 , and then we end up with the following lemma. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.8, we now define the games G 1,i and G 1,i . By the same arguments as in Section 3.3, we have the following two lemmas:
Proof: At a high level, those two games are only separated by the 2-universality of the underlying hash proof system. The following arguments are similar to Lemma 3.11 . Let m the i-th queried message. We have m = m * , so there exists an index i such that m i = m * i , where m i (resp. m * i ) denotes the i -th entry of m (resp. m * ). By the definition of HPR 0 -CMA security, m can not be a prefix of m * . Thus, either i ≤ |m * |, which leads to the same proof as in Lemma 3.11 , or i ≥ |m * | + 1 and m * j = m j for all j ≤ |m * |. In the latter case, A obtains the following equations in the unknown variables x 0 , x i in an information-theoretical way:
Initialize: Figure 18 : Games G0 to G2 for the proof of Theorem 5.4 .
where B x 0 and B x i are from Initialize, h 0 is from Chal(m * ), and u − x 0 is from Eval(m). I k+1 denotes the (k + 1) × (k + 1) identity matrix.
As shown in Lemma 3.11 , the last row of M ∈ Z (3k+2)×(2k+2) q is linearly independent of the first 2k rows (except with probability 1/q). Also, the last row is linearly independent of rows 2k + 1 to 3k + 1. Thus, u − x 0 is linearly independent of B x 0 , B x i and h 0 and therefore u is distributed uniformly at random in G 1,i .
Proof: In G 2 , we replace h 1 output by Chal(m * , c) with a random value. Similar to Lemma 3.12 , since all the answers of Eval are random and independent of x 0 , h 1 is uniformly random in the view of A.
We apply all the arguments before in a reverse order and then we easily get the following: G 0 is the real attack game and we have:
Initialize: Figure 19 : Games G0, (G1,i, G 1,i ) 1≤i≤Q , G1,Q+1, G2 for the proof of Theorem 5.9.
In games G 1,i , for the first i − 1 queries to the Eval oracle, (t, u, T, u) is answered with uniformly random values and the rest are answered as in the real scheme. To interpolate between G 1,i and G 1,i+1 , we also define G 1,i , which answers the i-th query to Eval by picking random t ← $ Z k+1 q and T ← $ Z (k+1)×k q . By the same arguments as in Appendix A.2, we have the following two lemmas:
Lemma A.13 There exists an adversary B with T(B) ≈ T(A) and
Proof: Similar to Lemma A.8, let m be the i-th query to Eval. As m = m * , there exists an index i such that m i = m * i , where m i (resp. m * i ) denotes the i -th entry of m (resp. m * ). We apply an informationtheoretical argument to show in G 1,i the values u and u are uniformly random. For simplicity, we assume x 0 and x j (j ∈ {0, i }) are learned by A. Similar to the proof of Lemma 3.11, we assume A learns B x 0 and B x i . By the definition of APR-CMA security (Definition 5.8), m can not be a prefix of m * . Thus, either i ≤ |m * | (Case 1) or i > |m * | + 1 and m * j = m j for all j ≤ |m * | (Case 2). Case 1: From the execution of G 1,i , A information-theoretically obtains the following equations in the unknown variables x 0 , x i :
where h 0 is from Chal(m * ), u and u are from Eval(m), and I k+1 is the (k + 1) × (k + 1) identity matrix.
Since (t, T) is chosen uniformly from Z (k+1)×(k+1) q in G 1,i , t and T are not in the span of B and (t, T) has rank k + 1 (except with probablity at most 1/q), which implies u − x 0 and u are independent of B x 0 and B x i . By m i = m * i , u − x 0 and u are also independent of h 0 . Case 2: Similarly, from the execution of G 1,i , A information-theoretically obtains the following equations in the unknown variables x 0 , x i :
As in Case 1, u − x 0 and u are linearly independent of B x 0 and B x i . It is easy to see that u − x 0 and u are linearly independent of h 0 .
We conclude u and u are distributed uniformly at random in G 1,i .
Proof: Note that A can ask at most Q-many Eval queries. In both G 1,Q+1 and G 2 , all answers of Eval are uniformly random and independent of the secret keys (x 0 , x 0 , . . . , x L ) where L = max{|m 1 |, . . . , |m Q |}. Hence, the values h 0 and h 1 from G 1,Q+1 are uniform in the view of A.
We apply the above arguments in a reverse order, we have the following lemma. Initialize:
Return (pk, dk) Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.6, G 3 is simulated without using y 0 and (Y i ) 0≤i≤ . By
as in Game G 2 . By the same argument as Lemma 4.6, we have [v] 2 , K * and C * are identical to G 2 .
Lemma B.4 There exists an adversary B 2 with T(B 2 ) ≈ T(A) and Adv hpr 0 -cma
In G 4 , we answer the Enc(id * ) query by choosing random K * . We construct algorithm B 2 in Figure 21 to show the differences between G 4 and G 3 is bounded by the advantage of breaking hpr 0 -cma security of MAC.
We note that, in games G 3 and G 4 , the values x i and x i are hidden until the call to Enc(id * ). In both games HPR-CMA real and HPR 0 -CMA rand , we have h = c *
which implies c * 1 is distributed identically in games G 3 and G 4 . If h 1 is uniform (i.e., B 2 is in Game HPR 0 -CMA rand ) then the view of A is the same as in G 4 . If h 1 is real (i.e., B 2 is in Game HPR-CMA real ) then K * = z 0 · A −1 c * 0 + x 0 · h, which means the view of A is the same as in G 3 . The proof follows by combining Lemmas B.1-B.4 and observing that G 4 = IND-HID-CPA rand . 
Thus, G 3 is identical to G 2 . 
Proof: In G 4 , we answer the Enc(id * ) query by choosing random K * and C * . We construct algorithm B 2 in Figure 23 to show the differences between G 4 and G 3 is bounded by the advantage of breaking APR-CMA security of MAC.
We note that, in both G 3 and G 4 , the values x i and x 0 are hidden until the call to Enc(id * ). It is easy to see c * 0 is uniform, since h and c * 0 are chosen uniformly at random. If (h 0 , h 1 ) is uniform (i.e. B 2 is Initialize:
// Games G0-G4 G ←$ GGen(1 λ ); A ←$ D k sk MAC = (B, x0, . . . , x , x 0 ) ←$ Gen MAC (G) For i = 0, . . . , :
Yi Enc(id * ): //Games G0, G1-G2 , G2 , G3 in Game APR-CMA rand ) then the view of A is the same as in G 4 . If (h 0 , h 1 ) is real (i.e. B 2 is in Game APR-CMA real ) then the view of A is the same as in G 3 .
The proof follows by combining Lemmas B.5-B.8 and observing that G 4 = PR-HID-CPA rand . 
C Identity-based Hash Proof System
In this section, we will show that our IBE construction from Section 4 gives a secure identity-based hash proof system (ID-HPS) [1] , which implies IND-CCA secure [18] and leakage-resilent [1] IBE. Moreover, one of our constructions is the first tightly secure ID-HPS without a "q-type" assumption in prime-order groups.
C.1 Definitions
We recall syntax and security of ID-HPS from [1] .
Definition C.1 (Identity-based Hash Proof System) An identity-based hash proof system (ID-HPS) consists of five PPT algorithms IDHPS = (Setup, USKGen, Encap, Encap * , Decap) with the following properties.
• The probabilistic key generation algorithm Setup(par) returns the (master) public/secret key (pk, sk). We assume that pk implicitly defines an identity space ID, an encapsulated-key set K. • The probabilistic user secret key generation algorithm USKGen(sk, id) returns the secret key usk [id] for an identity id ∈ ID. • The probabilistic valid encapsulation algorithm Encap(pk, id) returns a pair (c, K) where c is a valid ciphertext, and K ∈ K is the encapsulated-key with respect to identity id. • The probabilistic invalid encapsulation algorithm Encap * (pk, id) samples an invalid ciphertext c.
• The deterministic decapsulation algorithm Decap(usk[id], c) returns a decapsulated key K. For perfect correctness we require that for all λ ∈ N, all pairs (pk, sk) generated by Setup(1 λ ), all identities id ∈ ID, all usk[id] generated by USKGen(sk, id) and all (c, K) output by Encap(pk, id):
The security requirements for an ID-HPS are valid/invalid ciphertext indistinguishability (VI-IND) and smoothness. VI-IND security is defined via the games VI-IND real and VI-IND rand in Figure 24 . Note that VI-IND security game, the adversary is allowed to ask for usk[id * ] (where id * is the challenge identity) and that USKGen(id) returns the same answer when queried twice on the same identity. Smoothness is a statistical property saying that the decapsulated key K for an invalid ciphertext is distributed statistically close to the uniform distribution. 
C.2 Construction
Let D k be a matrix distribution that outputs matrices A ∈ Z (k+1)×k q . Let MAC be an affine MAC over Z n q with message space ID. In Figure 25 , we describe the transformation IDHPS[MAC, D k ]. We note that Setup, USKGen, Encap and Decap are the same as in IBKEM[MAC, D k ] from Section 4 and Encap * returns a random ciphertext C from the ciphertext space C = G n+k+1 
